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In this paper we examine the impact of campaign contributions on electoral 
results in Argentine national elections for the period 2005-2013. Using pre-
viously unavailable micro-level data on private campaign contributions we 
test several hypothesis concerning the relationship between contributions 
and electoral results. Our fi ndings suggest that while parties receive both 
public and private funds, only private contributions are signifi cantly associ-
ated with electoral performance –i.e. the higher the ratio of private to public 
contributions the higher the vote share. Interestingly, while challengers see 
an increase in vote shares as a result of an increase in private contributions, 
this is not the case for incumbents. One possible explanation for this is that 
incumbents have other sources of funding available to them –offi  cial ad-
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vertising, informal campaign spending- which may be substitutes to formal 
private funding. This may have important implications in terms of policy 
design as limiting (or even prohibiting) private contributions may actually 
be more detrimental to challengers than to incumbents, with the likely eff ect 
of increasing incumbency advantage even further.
Keywords: Campaign contributions; Elections; Incumbency adantage.
JEL Codes: D70; D72; D73; D78.
Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
En el presente documento se examina el impacto de las contribuciones de 
campaña en los resultados electorales de las elecciones nacionales argen-
tinas para el período 2005-2013. Utilizando micro-datos a nivel individual 
no disponibles anteriormente sobre las contribuciones privadas a las cam-
pañas, probamos varias hipótesis sobre la relación entre las contribuciones 
y los resultados electorales. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que, si bien los 
partidos reciben tanto fondos públicos como privados, sólo las contribucio-
nes privadas se asocian de manera signifi cativa con el desempeño electo-
ral, es decir, cuanto mayor es la proporción de contribuciones privadas a 
públicas, mayor es la proporción de votos. Curiosamente, mientras que los 
aspirantes ven un aumento en la proporción de votos como resultado de un 
aumento de las contribuciones privadas, este no es el caso de los titulares. 
Una posible explicación de ello es que los titulares tienen a su disposición 
otras fuentes de fi nanciación -publicidad ofi cial, gastos de campaña infor-
males- que pueden sustituir a la fi nanciación privada ofi cial. Esto puede 
tener importantes consecuencias en lo que respecta al diseño de políticas, 
ya que limitar (o incluso prohibir) las contribuciones privadas puede ser 
en realidad más perjudicial para los aspirantes que para los titulares, 
con el probable efecto de aumentar aún más la ventaja de los titulares.
Palabras clave: Contribuciones a las campañas; Elecciones; Ventaja de la 
titularidad.
Códigos JEL: D70; D72; D73; D78.
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I. Bൺർ඄඀උඈඎඇൽ ൺඇൽ ආඈඍංඏൺඍංඈඇ
“There are two things that are important in politics. The fi rst is 
money and I can’t remember what the second one is”
Marcus A. Hanna, 1895
The relationship between money and politics has long attracted the 
attention of scholars in political science and other social sciences. Theore-
tical work in the late 80’s and early 90’s in the fi eld of political economy 
fueled a surge in research in this fi eld. The interest is not merely academic 
since in recent decades, the spread of democratic conditions through the de-
veloping word has brought along various concerns regarding the eff ective 
functioning of political institutions. One such concern is related with the role 
of money in politics, or more specifi cally, political and electoral fi nance. This 
concern is particularly relevant for most Latin American countries which 
have sustained democratic conditions for several decades and have evolved 
into increasingly complex democracies with multiple political and economic 
actors. Argentina is of specifi c interest due to both its federal arrangement 
and its changing dynamic of party politics. While there are several studies 
of the relationship between campaign contributions and electoral outcomes 
for established democracies, very little theoretical and empirical research has 
been conducted for Latin American countries and specifi cally for Argentina.
Yet, in recent times, there appears to be growing voter dissatisfaction 
with the extent of these practices and more importantly with the infl uence 
of money on economic and political outcomes. In a 2015 survey by the Pew 
Research Center, 75% of respondents thought money’s infl uence on politics 
is greater today than ever before regardless of a respondent being Republi-
can or Democrat.1 Outside candidates have tackled this issue to some extent 
in their campaign platforms. During the 2016 USA Presidential Election 
campaign, both Trump and Sanders advocated for the reduction of legal 
(private) money in politics, albeit for diff erent reasons and motives. This 
was in stark contrast with the stance adopted by less extreme, pro-establish-
ment candidates such as Clinton, Bush and Rubio.2
1. Pew Research Org, “As more money fl ows into campaigns, Americans worry about its infl uence”. 
Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/as-more-money-fl ows-into-cam-
paigns-americans-worry-about-its-infl uence/ 
 2. Indeed, several observers and analysts believe that Clinton’s electoral chances were hampered by 
relying on the corporate establishment.
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This issue is all the more important considering the recent debate 
in the region concerning accountability and transparency and the eff orts ai-
med at improving the institutional design and its implementation. A recent 
study conducted by IDEA International (2012) shows that 23% of democra-
tic countries do not have any regulation on political fi nance. As the recent 
wave of democratization sweeps across much of the globe, more democratic 
countries are likely to introduce regulations on political fi nance. In Argen-
tina, public funding of parties dates back to 1957 but only in recent years 
there have been signifi cant changes in the institutional framework devised 
to regulate political fi nance.3 
There is evidence that money into politics has become ever more im-
portant in Argentina. In the last decade, offi  cial registered private contribu-
tions to all political parties increased from 77 million pesos in 2005 to 226 
million pesos in 2015 in constant terms.4 However, this is in only a partial 
account since some electoral analysts and experts suggest that it would take 
around 1000 million pesos for a major party to hold a competitive election 
in 2015.5 An estimate is four times higher than that offi  cially reported by all 
parties in the 2015 election.6
Despite this mismatch between offi  cial reporting and the real costs 
involved in campaign fi nance, it is hardly arguable that money has been 
playing an increasingly active role in electoral politics in Argentina. The 
structure of parties total funding is also important. The ratio of private to 
total contributions for all parties during the 2005-2013 periods is around 20-
30%. Since recorded public funding is equivalent to actual public funding, 
this ratio is likely to be higher (if we include total (offi  cial and unoffi  cial) 
private contributions.
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3. One of these changes was to outlaw private contributions from corporate and business fi rm donors 
in 2009. The stated goal behind that regulation was to limit the infl uence of special interest groups 
on electoral outcomes through formal channels. There is much debate whether this regulation 
actually improved transparency and accountability since it may have in fact encouraged informal 
donations by these special interest groups. We will address this issue later in the paper.
4. Note that we used private infl ation estimates to defl ate. Using offi  cial infl ation mesaures, money 
in politics increases as many as 5 times.
5. “¿Cuánto cuestan las campañas electorales?”, online newspaper available at https://www.lanacion.
com.ar/1781894-cuanto-cuestan-las-campanas-electorales
6. In fact, the legal spending limit for any party for the 2015 Presidential election was 250 million 
pesos
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the literature 
review. Section III introduces some theoretical considerations. Section IV 
outlines the system of electoral fi nance in Argentina. Section V describes the 
data and empirical strategy. Section VI presents a discussion of the results 
and implications.
II. Tඁൾ අංඍൾඋൺඍඎඋൾ ඈඇ ඉඈඅංඍංർൺඅ ൿංඇൺඇർൾ
Despite an increasing fl ow of academic studies, very little in terms 
of comparative work or empiric studies has been done. The narrowest de-
fi nition of “political fi nance” we could try is “money for electionneering”. 
In general terms, it refers to all money in the political process, but it takes 
so many forms that it is diffi  cult to defi ne. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
this paper, “political fi nance” will be understood to mean the fi nancing of 
ongoing political party activities and electoral campaigns (it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to cover all the interconnected aereas related to money 
in politics). There is discussion around the world about the best way or 
most appropriate model to face political fi nance. From the 1950’s, a great 
number of countries have incorporated a mixed (private and public) political 
funding process in their internal law. According to a study conducted by 
IDEA International in 2012, 66% of countries (out of 175) have adopted a 
strictly public funding system for regulating aspects of political and electo-
ral fi nance. Other countries use a mixed system of political fi nancing. Karl 
Nassmacher considers that the percentage of public funding in relation to 
total funding (total income) varies in each country: from 2% (United King-
dom) and 3% (USA), to 65% (Sweden) and 68% (Austria).
There is a large number of studies examining the relationship be-
tween campaign contributions and electoral outcomes for industrial coun-
tries, most notably the US. Early studies looked into the electoral eff ect of 
campaign contributions. Although the large majority of these studies fi nd 
either a relatively small positive eff ect or no signifi cant eff ect of private 
campaign contributions on electoral results, the fi ndings are confl icting. 
Some studies fi nd that electoral returns to private campaign contributions 
are much higher for the challenger than for the incumbent, given the in-
cumbent’s campaign spending [Jacobson (1978, 1985), Abramowitz (1988), 
Chappell (1982), and Palda and Palda (1998)]. There are also those stu-
dies which fi nd that electoral returns to both incumbent and challenger are 
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equally eff ective while there are also those which fi nd that neither is sig-
nifi cantly related with electoral results [Green and Krasno (1988), Gerber 
(1998), Levitt (1994)]. Finally, a small number of studies fi nd that campaign 
spending has a negative eff ect on incumbents election chances in legislative 
elections [Feldman and Jondrow (1984) and Ragsdale and Cook (1987)]. 
More recently, it has been suggested [Green and Krasno (1988), Gerber 
(1998), Moon (2002)] that the independent variable –campaign spending- is 
likely to be infl uenced by the dependent variable –some measure of electoral 
returns; taking this into account, these authors fi nd that there are no signi-
fi cant diff erences between the electoral returns of campaign spending for 
incumbents and challengers. These results are somewhat puzzling against 
the evidence that politicians seem to invest a lot of eff ort in raising funds and 
in light of the popular belief that money wins elections.
The relationship between campaign contributions and election re-
sults has been widely studied in the United States. However, studies of this 
type for Latin America are scarce; in the case of Argentina, aside from Rubio 
(1997) and Ferreira Rubio, Griner and Zovatto (2004) a few other studies 
analyzing the political fi nancing system, there are no empirical studies that 
deal with this issue.7 In fact, empirical studies of the eff ects of campaign 
contributions are virtually non-existent. This is mostly due to the fact that 
up to recent years, no micro-level data on campaign fi nance was available. 
The relative lack of theoretical approaches applied to the Argentine case is 
also striking: this is particularly relevant for Argentina where sustained de-
mocratic conditions for three decades have shaped an increasingly complex 
multi-party democracy with multiple political and economic actors.
In this paper, we aim at fi lling this empirical gap. Using a unique 
dataset collected from several sources –Poder Ciudadano, Camara Nacional 
Electoral, AFIP Codifi cation of Economic Activities, and the Ministerio del 
Interior– we test the model using data for all the national elections –Presi-
dential and Legislative, both defi nitive and primaries- from 2005 through 
2013. In this paper, we are interested in testing a main empirical hypothesis. 
We explore the eff ect of the amount of private contributions (relative to 
public funding) in explaining electoral results for both “incumbents” and 
“challengers”. To the best of our knowledge, this is the fi rst attempt to use 
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  7. Samuels (2001) is a notable exception where the author analyses the role of campaign contribu-
tions in Brazil in electoral outcomes –both for challengers and incumbents.
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microdata on campaign contributions to examine the relationship between 
electoral fi nance and election results for Argentina.
III. Tඁൾඈඋൾඍංർൺඅ ർඈඇඌංൽൾඋൺඍංඈඇඌ
Electoral competition between political parties represents a key as-
pect of political organization of modern societies. In recent decades, cam-
paign spending associated with electoral competition have increased signifi -
cantly, in part due to the use of more costly communication technologies. In 
a large number of countries, parties meet their campaign expenditures using 
three sources of funding: contributions from individuals, contributions from 
fi rms and special interest groups and contributions from the public sector. 
This is not only true for Latin American countries but also for most Euro-
pean countries. The evidence shows that in many cases public contributions 
outweigh private contributions by a large margin. Table 1 shows the num-
bers for Argentina.8
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Source 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Period avg
Public 0.48 0.77 0.69 0.87 0.77 0.72
Private 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.20
Other 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08
Table 1. Structure of campaign contributions: Argentina, 2005-2013
Despite the evidence that most electoral fi nance around the world 
takes the form of mixed fi nancing, most of the existing theoretical models 
analyze only extreme cases: either a pure public or a pure private case. The 
goal of this paper is to contribute to this literature by considering the mixed 
case –i.e parties fi nance their campaigns using both public and private funds. 
The mixed case is particularly interesting since both sources of fi nance tri-
gger divergent forces of electoral competition and diff erent intertemporal 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
8. The National Electoral Offi  ce reports other contributions coming from non-governmental organi-
zations and other sources of funding like central party reallocations specifi c for electoral cam-
paigns. Aside from the unusually large number in 2005 –mostly due to a change in the recording 
procedure which considered many public contributions as “other” contributions-, these other 
sources of funding represent on average less than 5% of total party contributions.
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implications. When it comes to private fi nance, parties are induced to design 
and announce policy proposals aligned with the preferences and interests 
of potential donors for the present election. This is not the case for public 
fi nance since it rewards parties on the basis of their vote shares in precedent 
elections.
In a two-party system scenario with voters preferences defi ned as 
usual, both forms of campaign fi nance aff ect policy positions in contrasting 
ways. While increasing public funds prompt parties to make less ideological 
proposals and converging to the median, vying for private funds creates an 
incentive for parties to propose more ideological policies. If we defi ne the 
private-to-public electoral contributions ratio as PPEC = pri  /pub  , where 
pri  and pub  are total private and public contributions to party “i” in year 
“t”, then the higher this ratio, the higher policy polarization will be.
Another important theoretical implication associated with the eff ect 
of electoral contributions is the relation between these and the vote shares 
of parties. If the two parties are symmetric, then each party’s vote share will 
be equal in equilibrium and independent of electoral contributions. If parties 
are assymetric, however, then there are diff erent results. If we assume that 
the assymetry lies in one party being the incumbent and the other being 
the challenger, then it may be the case that the challenger’s only source of 
funding is private contributions whereas the incumbent may be able to use 
offi  cial budget funds (non-campaign funds) to meet campaign expenditures 
and therefore infl uence its own vote share.
If campaign expenditures have an eff ect on the popularity of parties 
as it is usually assumed in the literature, then this assymetry will traduce 
in diff erent vote shares for incumbents and challengers. This diff erence 
constitutes what is it often called incumbency advantage. Interestingly, this 
advantage seems to be inversely related with the PPEC ratio: a reduction in 
private contributions relative to public funds have a greater negative eff ect 
on challengers than incumbents (as they have alternative sources of fi nance). 
Moreover, for this reason, it is possible that stricter regulations on political 
fi nance concerning caps and bans on private contributions to parties have 
diff ering eff ects depending on whether they are incumbents or challengers 
and have the ultimate eff ect of shoring up the incumbent’s advantage.
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Argentina elects both members of the upper and lower house using a 
closed-list proportional representation system with multi-member districts. 
Voters are only able to cast their votes for a party or an electoral alliance, 
thus they have little infl uence on who gets elected to either house. Twenty 
four electoral districts elect 257 members to the Chamber of Deputies (lower 
house) and 72 members to the Senate (upper house). The district magnitude 
ranges from 5 to 70 for the Deputies election. For the Senate election, all 
districts elect three members.
There exists a signifi cant degree of party fragmentation at the con-
gressional level in Argentine politics. It ranks among the highest in Latin 
America besides Brazil. The Laakso-Taagepera’s Eff ective Number of Par-
ties (ENP) measure has been on average around 6 for the period 2005-2013. 
At the time of writing this article, there were 37 parties represented in the 
lower house and 23 parties in the Senate.
Argentina use a two-round system for the national executive elec-
tion which involves a plurality system where a second round is held if the 
winning party fails to obtain either a 45% of the vote share or a 40% of the 
vote share with a margin of at least 10% against the runner up. Legislators 
are elected using multi-member districts with closed lists and a proportional 
rule to allocate seats to parties.
In each district, lower- and upper-house elections take place 
every two and six years, respectively. In other words, every district holds 
lower-house elections every two years concurrently but not all district hold 
upper-house elections concurrently. This means that not all parties compete 
in all districts at every election. Nominations are decided at the national-le-
vel party organs for national parties and at the state-level party organs for 
state/local parties. The existence of both national- and state-level parties 
coupled with the closed-list system has important implications in terms of 
electoral campaigning. In an open-list system, a prospective legislator has 
an incentive to invest in political capital outside her party to climb up the 
party list. This is the case in Brazil. In a closed-list system, such as in Ar-
gentina, a prospective legislator has in incentive to invest in political capital 
inside her party to climb up the ranks.
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These circumstances favor the existence of non-individualistic 
electoral campaigns in Argentine legislative elections. In fact, this seems 
to be the case with recent elections where most prospective legislators run 
non-individual events and accommodate to the needs of the party. More 
specifi cally, parties may have to balance between loyalty and/or seniority of 
legislator and popularity and standing outside the party ranks. Regardless 
of the result of this balance, parties fi nance their campaign expenditures by 
raising money collectively rather than individually.
Argentina has a mixed system of party fi nancing. As “fundamental 
institutions of the democratic system”9, political parties fi nance their activi-
ties with both public and private funds. In this article, we focus strictly on 
electoral fi nancing therefore we will not consider the regular funding parties 
receive for institutional strengthening and development. Public electoral 
contributions comprise a fi xed amount of money for ballot-printing and a 
variable amount of money for campaigning. The former is equal for all par-
ties and the latter is a function of past electoral performance.10 Parties can 
also collect private electoral contributions –both from fi rms and individuals 
up to 2009 when contributions from fi rms were prohibited. All political 
parties are required to keep books on these contributions and to submit two 
reports –preliminary and fi nal- to the National Electoral Authority. Parties 
that fail to do that are fi ned and/or are excluded from the recipients of public 
electoral contributions. To date, despite improvements in reporting stan-
dards, a signifi cant number of parties do not comply with the regulations.
One interesting feature of the Argentine case is that the legal regime 
governing political and electoral fi nance has been modifi ed three times in 
the last 20 years. The fi rst modifi cation came about shortly after one of the 
greatest economic crisis in history which triggered a political representa-
tion crisis. This regulation outlined and specifi ed the structure, content, and 
delimitations of the regime of political fi nance in Argentina. The second 
modifi cation involved changes toward improved transparency and accoun-
tability but only minor modifi cations concerning the nature, amounts and 
types of donors. The third modifi cation included one very signifi cant change 
which was to prohibit private contributions coming from fi rms, corporate 
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9. The fundamental provisions for the existence and functioning of parties are laid out in article 38 in 
the National Constitution. This was introduced by a constitutional reform in 1994.
10. Parties are required a certain amount of minimum votes to be entitled to this campaigning money.
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donors and other institutional investors. Although we would like to examine 
the impact on the structure of contributions of these institutional changes, 
the avaialble data will only allows us to make some conjectures. This is 
particularly relevant considering the discusion above in relation to the eff ect 
that tightening the regulations has on both incumbent and challengers.
The current regime is potentially biased against smaller parties: since 
bigger parties receive larger funding, they are usually those with the highest 
probability of winning the election. Because of this, it is possible that private 
contributions are directed towards the bigger parties.11 For example, for the 
2013 election, public contributions to the main 3 parties represented just over 
30% of total public contributions (out of 88 parties). The situation is even 
more striking when it comes to assymetries in private fi nancing: the same 3 
parties received almost 69% of all total private contributions (out of 60 par-
ties). As it can be seen, these assymetries do not result from the way the ins-
titutional regime is designed but also from the specifi cs electoral dynamics.
V. Dൺඍൺ ൺඇൽ ൾආඉංඋංർൺඅ ඌඍඋൺඍൾ඀ඒ
The data used in this paper come several diff erent sources.12 The 
electoral fi nance data came from three sources: the Cámara Nacional Elec-
toral, Dinero y Politica and the project La Ruta Electoral. This is to the best 
of our knowledge a unique dataset comprising public and private contribu-
tions to political parties in all 24 districts for all the Argentine national elec-
tions during 2005-2013. Electoral results were obtained from the Dirección 
Nacional Electoral and were cross-checked with the Atlas Electoral Project 
when there were discrepancies and missing data. The data cover several re-
cent elections –the 2007 and 2011 Presidential elections, all the Legislative 
elections from 2005 to 2013 and we also include the 2011 and 2013 primary 
elections13.  Summary statistics for selected variables are given in Table 2.
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11.  Political parties vary in number and depth in Argentina but they have been growing in number 
ever since the political representation crisis in 2001-02. As of 2015, there are 77 nation-wide 
parties recognized by the Cámara Nacional Electoral. The number of state-wide parties is several 
times higher. One of the reasons for this is that there are low barriers to entry. Another reasons 
is that several of the bigger parties have dismembered in the last 10-15 years and each faction 
has created a new party. In the period under study, there are on average 11 parties –both nation- 
and state-wide parties- per district competing in a legislative election. Many of the key electoral 
districts in terms of population size have a larger number of competing parties.
12. See the Methodological Appendix for detailed information on the data sources and the variables.
13. We also obtained some data for the year 2003 but decided against including it in the empirical 
analysis due to it being incomplete and sketchy.
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Statistic N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
primary 2,722 0.27 0.44 0 1
afi l 1,244 13,511.28 63,396.61 0 1,290,449
afi lpop 1,1 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.20
sh 2,72 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.82
shpre2 1,41 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.87
comp 2,722 12.26 6.49 2 30
marginpre 2,722 0.22 0.18 0.001 0.84
cbole_c 2,722 21,095.35 69,886.99 0.00 1,520,833
ccamp_c 2,722 14,758.32 66,404.03 0.00 2,050,502
cprip_c 2,722 30,631.51 269,602.70 0.00 8,960,474
cprie_c 2,722 6,039.04 145,153.40 0.00 7,089,441
coth_c 2,722 4,676.86 32,956.79 0.00 498,364
ctot_c 2,722 77,201.08 451,841.70 0.00 17,602,446
cpub_c 2,722 35,853.66 115,373.50 0.00 2,120,139
cpri_c 2,722 36,670.55 391,319.10 0.00 16,049,915
cbolet 1,433 0.44 0.29 0.00 1.00
ccampt 1,433 0.30 0.26 0.00 1.00
cpript 1,433 0.18 0.31 0.00 1.00
cpriet 1,433 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.97
cotht 1,433 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.00
cpubt 1,433 0.74 0.37 0.00 1.00
cprit 1,433 0.19 0.33 0.00 1.00
cpripub 2,722 2,425.34 39,874.41 0.0000 1,733,173
incpre 555 0.06 0.23 0 1
incleg 1,367 0.13 0.34 0 1
incleg2 1,034 0.10 0.29 0 1
incleg3 1,035 0.21 0.41 0 1
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
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Since our main interest is to study the relationship between campaign 
contributions and electoral results, the individual-level data were aggregated 
at the party level. This posed several methodological problems. Aside from 
having a large number of parties, longitudinal studies of Argentine politics 
are further complicated by the fact that parties are not always comparable 
between two consecutive elections. One such case is when party A runs 
for the election in year “t” and is part of an electoral coalition in the next 
election in year “t+1”. Clearly these are two diff erent units and should be 
treated as such. This problem is aggravated by recording defi ciencies from 
the offi  cial bodies.14 We decided to select the unit of analysis pragmatically 
using a Faustian criterion: use the party whenever we collected disaggrega-
ted electoral data and use the alliance whenever this was not possible. As a 
result of this, the unit of analysis results in “party and/or alliance” hybrid. 
This strategy allowed us to use all the information present in the raw data 
without making far fetched assumptions about the underlying coalitional 
dynamics. Since data on campaign contributions are reported at the party 
(not alliance) level, we decided to add up the contributions received by par-
ties that ran within an electoral coalition.15 
Figure 1 illustrates a partial correlation between our main varia-
bles, ratio of private contributions and vote shares. Note that we use two 
sub-samples: the full sample and a sample with only positive values --i.e. 
greater than zero- for both variables". 
Figure 2 provides a rough view of the heterogeneity between dis-
tricts in terms of the district-wide mean value of the ratio between private 
to total contributions. On average, the ratio of private-to-total contributions 
is just above 0.18 for the full sample (left panel), and 0.31 for the sample 
considering only those parties receiving positive amounts of both private 
14. One such problem is that electoral counts and reports are not centrally provided. Each district 
uses its own conventions regarding party denominations and alliances and there are diff erent 
criteria to report vote counts, particularly for the case of electoral alliances with some districts 
apportioning the votes received by each party within the alliance and some others not disaggre-
gating these data.
15.   This way of dealing with these problems meant three possible situations. One with parties running 
without an alliance where voting and contributions data are available at the party level-; another 
with parties running within an alliance where the voting and contributions data are available at 
the alliance level-; and another with parties running within an alliance where the voting data are 
available at the alliance level and contributions data are available at party level. The fi rst two cases 
pose no problems; for the latter, we add up party-level campaign contributions to match up with 
the electoral data in the case of alliances.
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Figure 1. Private contributions and vote shares
Figure 2. Private funds as fraction of total funds
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and public contributions (right panel). The province-wide means show sig-
nifi cant variation as can be seen in this fi gure. If we look at these ratios by 
province, however, we see that there is signifi cant variation between them. 
Focusing on the right panel, the ratio ranges from as low as 0.04 for Chaco 
(CHA) and Corrientes (COR) and to signifi cantly higher ratios in Neuquen 
(NEU) and Tierra del Fuego (TDF). This simple graph suggest that state-le-
vel eff ects may be present when considering the relationship between fi nan-
ce and votes. We will get back to this in our empirical specifi cation.
If we look at the structure of party fi nancing during the period it is 
interesting to note that the regime change brought about by the Ley 25670 
in 2009 appears to have had signifi cant eff ects on the structure of party 
fi nancing. Looking at Table 3, we can see how private funding has been 
decreasing as a means of electoral fi nancing.
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LV | N° 1| 2017 | ඉඉ. 111-139 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
The structure of our data can be summarized as follows. Our main 
variables are a party-alliance’s vote share and the amount and structure of its 
campaign contributions. These variables can be disaggregated by election, 
district and year. Hence, our vote share variable has the following disaggre-
gation:
sh  where i=1,...,N;s=1,...,S;h=1,...,H;t=1,...,T.
where sh  is the vote share of party/alliance i in district s in the 
election type h for the year t. In our specifi c case, there are 410 i parties/
alliances; s are the 24 provincial districts; h are election types –one of where 
we have two alternative codings –one, separating between Presidental and 
Congressional elections; the other, separating between Presidential; Dipu-
Concept 2007 2009 2011 2013
Ratio of private-to-total (full sample) 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.21
Ratio of private-to-total (positive 
private contributions) 0.53 0.51 0.32 0.39
Ratio of non-corporate (personal) to 
private (full sample) 0.84 0.89 1 1
Table 3. Structure of party fi nancing pre and after reform
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
tados (Lower House) and Senadores (Upper House/Senate) elections; and t 
are the election years. We include from 2005 to 2013 in our analysis.
In a strictly bi-partisan setting, the resulting dataset would most li-
kely be a balanced panel. In a multi-party setting with a large number of 
nation-wide parties, an even larger number of state-wide parties and com-
plex and volatile coalitional party dynamics, the resulting data would be 
signifi cantly unbalanced. Table 4 summarizes the number of cases (parties/
alliances) per year per district. Even if we consider elections that are held 
in all districts every two years –Diputados (LH)- the number of cases varies 
between 140 and 339. Since this is clearly not well suited to conform a 
panel-data structure we will use two alternatives for analyizing our data: 
complete pooling of observations and no-pooling (mixed eff ects).
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Offi  ce General Primary
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Total 2011 2013 Total
Diputados (LH) 181 339 271 154 140 1085 203 173 376
Presidente y Vice – 385 – 170 – 555 240 – 240
Senadores (UH) 46 110 101 43 44 344 62 60 122
Total 227 834 372 367 184 1984 505 233 738
Table 4. Parties/alliances by election type and elective offi  ce
In line with some of the standard models in the empirical literature, 
we test the infl uence of campaign contributions on the vote share of parties. 
Our baseline model includes alternative measures of campaign contributions 
plus aditional controls like the number of competing parties and the degree 
of electoral competition in a district. The baseline specifi cation is therefore:
sh = β + β  pri + β  comp + marginpre + β  oth + ϵ
where sh  and pri  are the vote share and amount of private con-
tributions received by party/alliance i in district s in the election type h for 
the year t respectively; comp  and marginpre  are the number of challen-
gers and the the degree of electoral competition in district s in election type 
h for the year t; oth  are other control variables –at the party and/or district 
level; ϵ  is a random error term.
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
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Dependent variable: sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cpri_c 0.0000
(0.00)
cpub_c 0.0000
(0.0000)
cpubt 0.08
(0.01)
cprit 0.09 0.06
(0.01) (0.01)
log(cpripub) 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
comp 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
msarginpre 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
log(cpripub):shpre2 0.01
(0.004)
shpre2 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.61
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
log(cpripub):comp 0.0000
(0.0001)
Constant 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1,431 1,431 1,431 911 891 891 891
R 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52
Adjusted R 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51
F Statistic 42.05 57.81 60.73 243.57 233.38 186.49 189.26
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
Table 5. Regression results - Pooled OLS
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
The models presented in Table 5 include all the parties that recei-
ve a strictly positive amount of campaign contributions, either private or 
public. About a third of the parties in the sample compete in elections but 
received no contributions at all.16 It would make little sense to include these 
observations since from a theoretical point of view, there is no relation to 
explore. Empirically, due to the large number of zeroes, it would call for a 
diff erent approach. We defi ne the variable of interest using three alternati-
ve measures. Firstly, we simply use the total amount of private and public 
contributions (due to infl ation during the period we defl ate the series and 
these are expressed at 2003 prices) entering linearly in the specifi cation. The 
results are presented in Model 1. Both   coeffi  cients   are   signifi cant    but 
its size  is very small. 
This is part due to scaling but also to a relatively small expected 
eff ect of contributions on vote share: an increase of one standard deviation 
in private contributions (public contributions) would increase a party’s vote 
share by around 0.01 (around 0.06). Controls have the expected sign: the 
larger the number of competing parties, the smaller a party’s vote share 
(comp) while the larger the margin of victory in the district in the previous 
election (marginpre) the larger the vote share for parties.
Models 2 and 3 use an alternative specifi cation for the independent 
variable. We do not use the total amounts of either contribution but rather 
a ratio of both public and private contribution to total contributions.17 We 
include the ratio of public-to-total contributions in model 2 and the ratio of 
private-to-total contributions in model 3. One surprising result is that the 
coeffi  cient for the public contributions ratio is negative, suggesting that the 
larger public contributions as fraction of total contributions the smaller the 
vote share.18 The ratio of private contributions is positive and signifi cant 
which gives the expected sign. In model 4, we introduce shpre2 which is 
a party-level variable measuring a party’s vote share in the previous elec-
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16. This may be due to diff erent factors. Firstly, it may be the case that a party was not entitled to 
public contributions since it failed to comply with the legal requirements to inform about its 
balance sheet. Secondly, it may be possible that a party did not receive any private contributions.
17. In addition to reducing the potential bias due to misdeclaration and missing data, since both 
public and private contributions respond to diff erent theoretical forces, it may be sensible to take 
ratios as a way of capturing both infl uences.
18. This result would not look so strange if parties, especially incumbents, are using public funds to 
fi nance their campaigns.
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tion.19 Despite our best eff orts, around 25% of the cases are dropped in 
model 4. Interestingly, this variable comes out as highly signifi cant and 
positive while cprit decreases its size somewhat but it is still signifi cant.
Models 5 through 7 use our fi nal alternative specifi cation for the 
variable measuring private and public contributions. This measure is what 
most closely approaches our theoretical considerations. We defi ne cpripub 
as the ratio of a party’s private contributions to its public contributions.20 
It is interesting to note that the cpripub variable –ratio of private to public 
funding- emerges as positive and signifi cant in all three models. All other 
variables retain their sign and signifi cance except for marginpre. It should 
also be noted that models 4 through 7 provide a much better fi t of the model 
than models 1-3.21 Models 6 and 7 run some interactions between cpripub 
and comp and shpre2. The fi rst interaction is to see whether there is eviden-
ce of whether relation between the ratio of private-to-public contributions 
and vote shares diff ers with the number of competitors in a district. The 
second interaction is more intuitively interesting: whether the relation be-
tween fi nancing and votes depends on a party’s past electoral performance. 
Interestingly, it appears that the larger a party’s previous vote share the less 
eff ective private fi nancing is.
Table 6 reproduces the same models but using a smaller sample, 
comprising only parties with positive private contributions. Thus we restrict 
our attention to parties that have actually managed to attract private funding, 
which is one of the key motives behind our theoretical considerations. The 
results in this table are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5. There is a 
signifi cant loss in the number of observations as only around 20% of the 
19. This variable took considerable time to build. Due to the considerations made regarding the coa-
litional dynamics in the Argentine political system, we decided to build two alternative variables 
measuring the past performance of parties. We defi ne a strict shpre variable where for any party 
to be assigned a “shpre” it has to feature in two consecutive elections with exactly the same name 
and without being in an alliance. This variable meant that many cases were dropped due to name 
changes and not participating in consecutive elections. For the second, more fl exible, “shpre2”, 
we relax these criteria and include all those parties which changed their name, which did not par-
ticipate in consecutive elections (but had at least participated in any other previous election) and 
we also tracked identical candidates participating in diff erent elections with diff erent alliances.
20. Since this ratio can include a zero in the denominator –i.e public contributions amount to zero-, 
we make a slight transformation of all the data by adding a very small constant to all contribu-
tions. This is to overcome the problems that an indeterminate fraction would bring along.
21. Although not directly comparable, we ran models 1 through 3 with the exact subsamples used to 
produce models 4 throught 7. The results are qualitative and quantitatively similar.
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Dependent variable: sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cpri_c 0.0000
(0.00)
cpub_c 0.0000
(0.0000)
cpubt 0.04
(0.02)
cprit 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
log(cpripub) 0.0002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
comp 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(cpripub):shpre2 0.01
(0.01)
shpre2 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(cpripub):comp 0.0001
(0.0002)
Constant 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 593 593 405 405 405 405
R 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Adjusted R 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43
F Statistic 20.91 23.12 23.65 79.28 77.02 61.61 62.15
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
Table 6. Regression results - Pooled OLS - Reduced Sample
 (Only positive private contributions)
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
parties in the sample receive private contributions larger than zero. Models 
1 through 4 are qualitatively similar to those in the previous table. The va-
riable cpripub, however, loses signifi cance in models 5 to 7. Whether this is 
due to the signifi cantly smaller sample or to the fact that we have missing 
variables, we do not know.
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Dependent variable: sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri_c 0.0000
(0.00)
cpub_c 0.0000
(0.0000)
cprit 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.09 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
shpre2 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.67
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 1,431 911 911 911 891
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,126.64 1,172.54 1,187.92 1,185.94 1,125.62
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,089.78 1,138.84 1,149.40 1,142.61 1,087.29
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
Table 7. Regression results - Linear Mixed Eff ects
The previous models have not taken into account the structure of the 
data. We now take this into account by specifying a mixed-eff ects model 
where we introduce and model party-, state- and election-level variables. 
Table 8 reproduces most of the models in Table 5 although we now introduce 
varying intercepts to control for diff erences in the eff ect of private contribu-
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Source: Own elaboration based on data from Cámara Nacional Electoral (CNE)
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Dependent variable: sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri_c 0.0000
(0.00)
cpub_c 0.0000
(0.0000)
cprit 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
shpre2 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 405 405 405 405
Akaike Inf. Crit. 456.99 463.17 461.17 459.17 456.13
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 426.29 435.14 429.14 423.14 424.10
Note:  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
tions on vote shares across provinces. We test diff erent group eff ects –state 
group eff ects (idjur), election group eff ects (elec2) and primary election 
group eff ect (primary). Both the results (not shown here) evidence that the 
state and election type variables contribute to explaining an important part 
of the variance in the dependent variable. The results for the random in-
tercepts are shown in Figure 3. Looking at the models, it can be seen that 
models 2 to 4, where we use the ratio of private-to-total contributions are the 
models that best fi t the data. The coeffi  cient is positive and signifi cant and 
signifi cantly larger than in the previous tables.
Table 8. Regression results - Linear Mixed Eff ects
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Table 9. Regression results - Linear Mixed Eff ects 
(Only positive contributions)
Dependent variable: sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri_c 0.0000
(0.00)
cpub_c 0.0000
(0.0000)
cprit 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
shpre2 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 405 405 405 405
Akaike Inf. Crit. 456.99 463.17 461.17 459.17 456.13
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 426.29 435.14 429.14 423.14 424.10
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
Figure 3. Random intercepts
Cൺආඉൺං඀ඇ ൿංඇൺඇർൾ ൺඇൽ ඇൺඍංඈඇൺඅ ൾඅൾർඍංඈඇඌ...
idjur
TUC
SCR
TDF
SFE
SJU
FOR
COR
LRI
SGO
RNE
CBA
LPA
ERI
BA
NEU
CHU
SAL
MZA
CABA
SLU
MIS
0.00 0.02 0.04
(Intercept)
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Dependent variable: sh
Inc Ch Inc (RS) Cha (RS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cprit 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
comp 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.001
(0.002) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.002)
marginpre 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.13
(0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08)
shpre2 0.45 0.25 0.34 0.67
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
Constant 0.32 0.06 0.32 0.05
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 123 265 80 112
R 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.51
Adjusted R 0.40 0.31 0.40 0.49
F Statistic 21.35 31.12 14.08 28.15
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p< 0.01
Table 10. Regression results - Incumbents vs Challenger Pooled OLS
Figure 4. Vote shares and private fi nancing: Incumbents vs Challengers
Fඋൾංඅඅൾ, Sඈൿൿංൾඍඍං
Finally, we would like to test whether the relationship between mo-
ney and votes is similar for incumbents than for challengers. In order to do 
that, we split the samples and work with two diff erent sub-samples, one for 
incumbents, another for challengers. The results of doing this are shown in 
Table 10. The most striking result here is that cprit has a diff erent sign for in-
cumbents and challengers. In the fi rst two columns, using the larger sample, 
it can be seen that cprit is negatively and signifi cantly correlated with in-
cumbent’s vote share while it is positively and signifi cantly correlated with 
challenger’s vote share. These results reproduce some of the fi ndings in the 
early literature on congressional voting in the United States, despite the fact 
that we are somehow controling endogeneity using shpre2. However, they 
are based on a rather small number of observations and caution is advised 
when interpreting them. We provide a plot of the relationship between mo-
ney and votes for both sub-samples, incumbents and challengers in Figure 4.
More importantly, this diff erence for incumbents and challengers 
may be due to the so-called incumbency advantage eff ect, which we do not 
capture explicitely in our estimation model. One possible correction of this 
would be to include the offi  cial advertising expenditures made by the incum-
bent government in the months prior to the election. 22
VI. Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇඌ
In this paper, we make a fi rst attempt at testing empirically the rela-
tionship between electoral (party) fi nancing and electoral results. Although 
still preliminary, our fi ndings support the hypothesis that the larger the share 
of private contributions in relation with total contributions, the larger the 
vote share. This result holds even if we control for other party-level charac-
teristics such as the vote share in the previous election and the size of the 
party affi  liate base and other district-level characteristics such as the number 
of challengers in a given election and the margin of votes between the win-
ner and runner in the previous election. These results are pretty robust to 
testing for alternative specifi cations and diff erent econometric techniques. 
One aspect we do not fully account for is endogeneity of the independent 
variable cprit. Although we make an attempt to control for it by including a 
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LV | N° 1| 2017 | ඉඉ. 111-139 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
22. To the date of writing this version of the paper, we have not been able to process these data. It is 
available, however for the period 2012-2013, disaggregating every form of advertising hired by 
the national incumbent for both executive and legislative offi  ces.
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party’s past electoral performance and interacting it with the cprit variable. 
It may well be the case that the ratio of private to total contributions is a 
linear function of the vote share of parties. At the time of writing this paper, 
we unable to fi nd a good instrument to test for this since most electoral/
political variables correlated with private contributions are also correlated 
with electoral outcomes.
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VIII. Aඉඉൾඇൽංඑ: ൽൺඍൺ Sඈඎඋർൾඌ ൺඇൽ ආൾඍඁඈൽඈඅඈ඀ඒ ඈൿ ൺ඀඀උൾ඀ൺඍංඈඇ
Data on public and private campaign contributions were obtained 
from three diff erent sources. Firstly, from the Cámara Nacional Electoral 
which is the national electoral organ in charge of supervising party acti-
vity. Secondly, from the Dinero y Política website. Dinero y Política was 
launched by Poder Ciudadano, an Argentine NGO which also serves as the 
local branch of Transparency International. Their data was assembled on 
the basis of the offi  cial records held at the Cámara Nacional Electoral. At 
the time of writing this paper, these data were available digitally at http://di-
neroypolitica.org. Dinero y Política provided the data for the 2007 and 2009 
elections while the remaining years –2005, 2011 and 2013- were obtained 
from the Cámara Nacional Electoral. All these data come at diff erent levels 
of aggregation. Public contributions are divided between ballot-printing and 
campaign funds. Private contributions detail individual-level data on name 
of donor, gender, district, party the donation goes to and amount of contribu-
tion. After processing the raw data to remove duplicates and consolidating 
multiple contributions from identical donors in a single election, we are 
left with a database of around 40000 individual party contributions for the 
period 2003-2013.
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Data on election results and vote shares were obtained from the Mi-
nisterio del Interior y Transporte for all the National elections –both Pre-
sidential and legislative- between 2007 and 2011.23  We also collected data 
from the Atlas Electoral run by Andy Tow when offi  cial information was 
inaccurate or missing. Since the data on party and alliance names was not 
homogeneous between these two sources –in several cases, the names of 
the parties in two diff erent electoral districts or election years did not match 
even when using that same data source-, we had to homogeneize and recode 
party and alliance names using the party and alliance codes registered in 
the Cámara Nacional Electoral. This was necessary to avoid recording one 
party as two diff erent parties if indeed the diff erences were only due to a 
mismatch in the names contained in the data sources. Another issue was 
deciding on how to assign individual campaign contributions –on a party 
or alliance basis. In order to maximize the number of observations, we de-
cided to use the data as was reported in the Dinero y Política database. The 
contributions can be directed both to the party and/or to the alliance and this 
introduced some problems when pairing these variables with the electoral 
variables –we worked with electoral results at the party level unless the 
party was part of an alliance in which case we used.
Finally, we used the Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
(AFIP) database of economic activities to assign every corporate donor to an 
economic sector. Since there are over 800 economic activities listed in the 
AFIP records, we recoded the activities into 29 economic sectors following 
loosely their coding numbers. These sectors are: Agro, Ganadería y Caza; 
Pesca, Minería y Actividades Extractivas; Industria Alimentaria; Industria 
Tabacalera; Industria Textil y Calzado; Industria Maderera, Papel e Impre-
siones; Industria Petroquímica y Farmacéutica; Industria Plásticos y Cau-
cho; Industria Vidrio, Cerámica y Construcción; Industria Acero, Metales y 
Herramientas; Industria Maquinas y Electrodomésticos; Industria Eléctrica, 
Óptica y Fotografía; Industria Automotor y Transporte; Industria Muebles, 
Juguetes y Deportes; Construcción y Edifi cación; Ventas Varias; Ventas al 
por Mayor; Ventas al por Menor; Servicios Alojamiento y Gastronómicos; 
Servicios Transporte, Almacenamiento y Transmisión de Datos; Servicios 
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23. There were two Presidential elections during that period in 2007 and 2011 and three legislative 
elections in 2007, 2009 and 2011. Also, in 2011, for the fi rst time, compulsory primary elections 
were held. We also collected information on votes for the two primary elections –Presidential 
and legislative.
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Banca, Seguros e Intermediación Financiera; Servicios Profesionales; Ser-
vicios Administración Pública; Servicios Enseñanza; Servicios de Salud y 
Sociales; Servicios Esparcimiento y Otros; Servicios Organizaciones Polí-
ticas.
To integrate the “base partidos” we aggregated the individual contri-
butions into a single observation for every party that received either a zero 
or a positive amount of individual contributions.24
24. Note that all the registered parties complying with the regulations of the Cámara Nacional Elec-
toral are entitled to a minimum amount of public funds for their electoral campaign
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